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Abstract 
Human reasoning involves both heuristic and analytic processes. This study of belief bias in 
relational reasoning investigated whether the two processes occur serially or in parallel. Participants 
evaluated the validity of problems in which the conclusions were either logically valid or invalid and 
either believable or unbelievable. Problems in which the conclusions presented a conflict between 
the logically valid response and the believable response elicited a more positive P3 than problems in 
which there was no conflict. This shows that P3 is influenced by the interaction of belief and logic 
rather than either of these factors on its own. These findings indicate that belief and logic influence 
reasoning at the same time, supporting models in which belief-based and logical evaluations occur in 
parallel but not theories in which belief-based heuristic evaluations precede logical analysis. 
Keywords: Dual process theory, belief bias, ERP, P3, N2 
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Heuristic and Analytic Processes in Reasoning: An Event-Related Potential Study of Belief Bias 
 
The idea that there are two kinds of thinking has a long history within psychology (e.g., James, 
1890/1950). One popular distinction is between ‘intuitive’ and ‘analytic’ thought. Theoretical 
accounts advancing this idea are referred to collectively as dual process theories (Evans, 2008). 
Recently dual process theories have been successful in explaining a range of empirical phenomena in 
reasoning and decision making (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich 
& West, 2000). Dual process theories all rely on two types of processing that vary in a number of 
properties, most importantly whether they make high or low demands on working memory (Evans, 
2008). These will be referred to here as heuristic and analytic processes (e.g., Evans, 2006). A 
number of methods have been used to demonstrate the presence of two types of reasoning process 
(e.g., De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010; De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008). However, a 
key theoretical question remains unresolved: How do these processes interact? 
Several models have been suggested (Evans, 2007). For the purpose of this paper these will be 
categorized into two types – serial and parallel – according to the sequence in which the two kinds 
of thinking occur. Serial models propose that one set of processes occurs prior to the other set. An 
example is the default-interventionist model (Evans, 2007). In this model heuristic responses are the 
default response, but the analytic process may intervene subsequently to alter the response. Parallel 
models propose that heuristic and analytic processes occur simultaneously. An example is Sloman’s 
dual process model of reasoning (Sloman, 1996). Previous behavioral studies have tested these 
models, leading to differing conclusions (e.g., Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Handley, Newstead, & 
Trippas, 2011). The aim of the present study is to use event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to 
establish if serial or parallel models provide the most accurate account of dual process theory. 
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Belief bias in reasoning 
Belief bias is the tendency when reasoning to judge conclusions based on prior beliefs rather 
than logical validity (e.g., Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000). This 
bias has been found in a range of reasoning tasks such as syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Evans et al., 
1983; Klauer et al., 2000), relational reasoning (e.g., Banks, 2013; Roberts & Sykes, 2003), 
conditional reasoning (Evans, Handley, & Bacon, 2009), and transitive reasoning (Andrews, 2010). 
The study of belief bias is a major area of investigation for dual process theories (Evans, 2003). 
In a typical belief bias experiment participants are presented with some premises and asked to 
evaluate a conclusion, see Table 1 for examples. The logical validity and believability of the 
conclusion are manipulated independently, resulting in four conditions: believable valid; unbelievable 
valid; believable invalid; unbelievable invalid. In the first and last condition there is no conflict 
between these processes because they both cue the same response. In the middle two conditions 
there is a conflict because the two processes cue different responses. Dual process theories of belief 
bias differ in their explanation of how this conflict is resolved. 
Serial models of belief bias predict that a belief-based response is initially cued by a heuristic 
process but this can be overridden by a logical response cued by an analytic process (e.g., Stupple, 
Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Parallel models predict that both belief-based and logical 
processes operate from the start and compete to cue a response. If these responses conflict then one 
of them is inhibited (e.g., De Neys, 2012; Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2011). 
 
Belief bias and ERPs 
A small number of studies have used ERP techniques to investigate reasoning. The first study 
of belief bias using ERPs was conducted by Luo et al. (2008). They found an enhanced P500 in 
problems where belief inhibited the logical response compared to problems where belief facilitated 
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it. However, the experimental design prevents any firm conclusions being drawn about dual 
reasoning processes. First, the ERPs were time locked to the onset of the minor premise, before the 
conclusion was presented. Therefore the believability of the conclusion was irrelevant to the ERPs 
reported. With this approach it is not possible to test many current models of belief bias that explain 
the effect in terms of the influence of the believability of the conclusion. A second concern with this 
timing is that the ERP measured both reading of the premise (six to eight Chinese characters) and 
subsequently reasoning about it rather than solely reasoning. Third, the study used only invalid 
problems. Therefore it is not possible to manipulate logical validity and test the characteristic 
interaction of logic and belief that is found in studies of belief bias. Finally, as no behavioral effect of 
belief bias was found, it is not certain that the task elicited the phenomenon.  
A subsequent study by Luo et al. (2013) found an increased positive potential 200-400 ms 
prior to a correct response when belief and logic conflicted compared to when they did not. By time 
locking to the response rather than the onset of the conclusion this design does not enable a 
conclusion to be drawn about whether the initial conclusion processing occurs serially or in parallel. 
Only their eventual effect on responding can be detected. 
An N2 component has also been found on reasoning tasks. The N2 is associated with 
cognitive control (Folstein & van Petten, 2008). In a study of heuristics in judgment a differential N2 
was found in poor compared to good reasoners, which led the authors to conclude that poor 
reasoners experienced more difficulty inhibiting biased thinking (De Neys, Novitskiy, Ramautar & 
Wagemans, 2010). 
 
The present study 
The present study develops the approach to studying belief bias in order to compare serial and 
parallel models of dual process theories. We introduce a full factorial design that manipulates both 
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logic and belief, enabling a test of both of these factors. We use a wide range of problems to reduce 
the likelihood that the format of the problem becomes over-learnt and to avoid a ceiling effect 
masking the behavioral effects of belief bias. Finally, the problems are designed so that it is not 
possible to evaluate the conclusion until the onset of the final word. ERPs are time locked to this 
onset. Therefore the ERPs are more precisely linked to the evaluation of the conclusion and 
confounds with other processes are reduced. 
We assume that participants read the premises and the first part of the conclusion and form a 
representation of this information. The critical final word is evaluated within the context of this 
representation. The differences in ERPs elicited by the final word across conditions indicate the 
form of the initial representation and the processes influencing its evaluation. 
The main predictions of the study concern the timing of the influence of belief and logic. If the 
serial models of belief bias are correct, the ERPs will initially differ solely as a function of belief 
because the processes responding to belief are predicted to occur first. If the parallel models are 
correct, both logic and belief will influence the evaluation at the same time because processes 
responding to these factors are predicted to occur at the same time. There will initially be an 
interaction of these two processes resulting in different ERPs when the two processes generate 
similar conclusions (no conflict problems) compared to different conclusions (conflict problems). 
Two components are of particular relevance to this task, N2 and P3. N2 amplitude reflects 
cognitive control and is involved in the resolution of response conflicts (Folstein & van Petten, 
2008). The amplitude of N2 is greater when there is a response conflict. In this task, conflict occurs 
when logic and belief cue different responses. The serial models predict that the initial conclusion 
processing is purely belief-based, and any conflict with logic should occur much later than the typical 
N2 time window. Therefore there will be no difference in N2 amplitude between conflict and no 
conflict problems if the serial models are correct. Parallel models predict that logic and belief are 
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processed simultaneously, leading to a response conflict in conflict problems but not in no conflict 
problems. Therefore N2 amplitude will be greater in conflict problems than no conflict problems if 
the parallel models are correct. 
The amplitude of P3 is determined by the allocation of attentional resources when working 
memory is updated (Donchin & Coles, 1988). This occurs when the mental representation of the 
current context is revised (Donchin, 1981). In this study, the representation is an interpretation of 
the conclusion. If evaluation based only on belief occurs first, as predicted by serial models, then 
there will be a difference in P3 between believable conclusions that are expected and unbelievable 
conclusions that are not expected. There will be no effect of logical validity as logic is not predicted 
to influence the conclusion at this stage. If evaluation is based on belief and logic at the same time, 
as predicted by parallel models, there will be a difference between no conflict problems that are 
expected as both logic and belief-based processes lead to the same interpretation, and conflict 
problems in which the final word is unexpected either logically or compared to prior beliefs. 
The latency of P3 reflects stimulus evaluation time (e.g., Kutas, McCarthy, & Donchin, 1977; 
Magliero, Bashore, Coles, & Donchin, 1984). In this study the stimuli are conclusions that are 
evaluated as valid or invalid. If evaluation based on belief occurs first then the latency of P3 will be 
determined by belief and not by logic. If evaluation is based on belief and logic at the same time 
then the latency of P3 will be determined by the interaction of logic and belief. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Eighteen psychology students (9 females, 9 males) took part in the experiment in return for an 
honorarium. Five participants were excluded due to a high number of errors resulting in insufficient 
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trials for analysis. All spoke English as a first language, were right-handed and had normal or 
normal-corrected vision. 
 
Materials 
Participants were presented with 192 relational reasoning problems, based on the reasoning task 
of Roberts and Sykes (2003), in which the logic (valid/invalid) and believability 
(believable/unbelievable) of the conclusions were manipulated in a full factorial design. Examples 
are presented in Table 1. The problems consisted of three premises and a conclusion. Four parallel 
versions of each problem were created. The logical validity of the conclusion was manipulated by 
changing the premises so that the same conclusion was either valid or invalid. A nonsense term was 
included so that this manipulation did not require premises that conflict with prior knowledge that 
can be difficult to integrate into a coherent representation (Klauer, Musch & Naumer, 2000). The 
believability of the conclusion was manipulated by reversing the elements in the conclusion.  
 
Procedure 
Participants silently read the premises and conclusion and then responded either that the 
conclusion was valid or invalid. They were instructed to assume that the premises were true and to 
accept the conclusion as valid only if it followed necessarily from the premises. Figure 1 presents a 
sample trial sequence. After initial instructions to blink and a fixation dot, the premises were 
presented on a computer monitor, one at a time for 3 seconds each, with a fixation dot presented 
between each for 500 ms. The conclusion was then presented with the final word omitted for 2000 
ms. Then the final word of the conclusion was presented – only at this point was it possible to 
evaluate whether the conclusion was valid or not. After a further 2,500 ms the letters ‘V’ and ‘I’ 
appeared on either side of the screen. Participants had two response buttons, one for each hand. If 
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they thought the conclusion was valid, they pressed the response button that corresponded to the 
side of the screen on which the letter ‘V’ was presented. If they thought the conclusion was invalid, 
they pressed the response button that corresponded to the side of the screen on which the letter ‘I’ 
was presented. The side on which the letters ‘V’ and ‘I’ appeared varied randomly on each trial so 
that participants could not start preparing their motor response until they appeared. This ensured 
that the EEG recording between the presentation of the final word of the conclusion and the 
presentation of response options measured only reasoning and not response execution. 
 
EEG recording & analysis 
Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was recorded from 32 Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes located 
according to the 10-20 system, with 4 additional electrooculogram (EOG) electrodes placed above 
and below the right eye and at the outer canthi. Data were recorded in DC mode at 500 Hz using an 
average reference. Impedance was kept below 5 kΩ. Data were re-referenced offline to linked 
earlobes and low-pass filtered at 40 Hz (24 dB/octave). Trials containing eye blinks and other eye 
movement artefacts were rejected when horizontal EOG exceeded ±40 µV and vertical EOG 
exceeded ±80 µV. The data were then segmented into 900 ms epochs, including a 100 ms pre-
stimulus baseline relative to the onset of the final conclusion word. The epochs were baseline 
corrected using the mean pre-stimulus voltage in the 100 ms pre-stimulus period. Average ERPs for 
correct trials were calculated for each condition separately. The mean number of trials for each 
condition was: believable valid, 33.5; unbelievable valid, 30.2; believable invalid, 24.1; unbelievable 
invalid, 31.2. The number of trials analyzed differed across conditions F(3, 36) = 7.73, p < .001, η2 = 
0.39. As only logically correct trials were included in the analysis these differences reflect the 
predicted pattern of error rate that is necessary to demonstrate the characteristic behavioral effect of 
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belief bias. A supplementary analysis below tests a subgroup of participants with equal trial numbers 
across conditions and replicates the most theoretically important differences between conditions. 
Amplitudes were measured as the mean voltage in a given measurement window. Mean 
amplitudes for the N2 were calculated at electrode site Fz, FCz and Cz in the time range 250 – 370 
ms and for the P3 component at electrodes Fz, Cz, and Pz in the time range 300 - 500 ms. The N2 
component was defined as the largest negative-going peak in the time range 200 – 400 ms. The P3 
component was defined as the largest positive-going peak in the time range 300 – 700 ms. Peak 
latency of N2 and P3 were calculated as the time from stimulus onset to the maximum amplitude of 
each peak respectively. All EEG measures were analyzed with a 2 belief × 2 logic × 3 electrode 
repeated measures ANOVA. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied when the assumption 
of sphericity was violated and uncorrected degrees of freedom, the corrected p value, an epsilon are 
reported (Jennings & Wood, 1976). Post-hoc analyses were conducted using Bonferroni corrected 
multiple t tests. 
 
Results 
 
Behavioral results 
Table 2 presents the behavioral results for each condition. Valid conclusions were accepted more 
frequently than invalid conclusions, F(1, 12) = 37.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .76. Believable conclusions 
were accepted more frequently than unbelievable conclusions, F(1, 12) = 13.29, p = .003, ηp
2 = .53. 
There was a significant interaction of logic and belief F(1, 12) = 8.26, p = .014, ηp
2 = .41. Post-hoc 
analyses showed that there was a marginally non-significant difference between believable valid and 
unbelievable valid conclusions, t(12) = 2.53, p = .027, with a trend towards accepting more 
believable conclusions. Believable invalid conclusions were accepted significantly more often than 
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unbelievable invalid conclusions, t(12) = 3.79, p = .003. The effect of belief on conclusion 
acceptance was greater for invalid than valid conclusions. This pattern of results replicates the typical 
findings in studies of belief bias (e.g., Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Roberts & Sykes, 2003). 
 
ERP amplitudes 
Figure 2 depicts the grand average ERP waveforms and topographic amplitude plots. 
N2 Amplitude. N2 amplitude was more negative in frontal than central electrode sites, F(2,24) 
= 8.02, p = .008, ε = .65, ηp
2 = .40, with the amplitude at Fz more negative than at Cz, t(12) = 3.05, p 
= .01, but there were no significant differences between other electrodes t(12) < 2.6, p > .02 (both 
comparisons). There was no significant effect of logic, F(1,12) = 1.98, p = .185, ηp
2 = .14, or belief, 
F(1,12) = 0.53, p = .481, ηp
2 = .04. There was a significant interaction between logic and belief, 
F(1,12) = 7.4, p = .019, ηp
2 = .38. As there was no interaction of belief or logic with electrode site 
(F(2,24) < 0.5, p > .7, ε = .65, ηp
2 < .02, both comparisons) mean amplitude was pooled across sites 
for the post-hoc tests. There was no significant difference between believable valid and unbelievable 
valid conclusions, t(12) = -1.21, p = .25. The difference between believable invalid and unbelievable 
invalid conclusions was marginally non-significant, t(12) = 2.52, p = .027, with a trend towards 
greater negativity for unbelievable conclusions. 
P3 Amplitude. P3 amplitude increased from frontal to parietal electrode sites, F(2,24) = 24.07, p 
< .001, ε = .94, ηp
2 = .67, with the largest amplitude at Pz, followed by Cz and then Fz (all t(12) > 
3.5, p ≤ .004). There was no significant effect of logic, F(1,12) = 0.83, p = .380, ηp
2 = .07, and no 
effect of belief F(1,12) = 0.001, p = .977, ηp
2 = .00. There was a significant interaction between logic 
and belief, F(1,12) = 13.61, p = .003, ηp
2 = .53. As there was no interaction of belief or logic with 
electrode site (F(2,24) < 1.3, p > .25, ε = .94, ηp
2 < .1, both comparisons) mean amplitude for belief 
and logic was pooled across sites for the post-hoc tests. Mean P3 amplitude was greater for 
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unbelievable valid than believable valid conclusions but this difference fell marginally short of 
significance after Bonferroni correction, t(12) = -2.55, p = .026. The pattern was reversed for invalid 
conclusions; P3 amplitude was larger for believable invalid than unbelievable invalid conclusions, 
t(12) = 3.03, p = .011. P3 amplitude was larger in problems where belief and logic conflict than in no 
conflict problems. There was a three way interaction of electrode site, logic and belief, F(2,24) = 
7.37, p = .008, ε = .94, ηp
2 = .38 indicating that, following Bonferroni correction, the interaction of 
logic and belief was present at Cz, F(1,12) = 13.16, p = .003, ηp
2 = .52, and Pz F(1,12) = 20.21, p = 
.001, ηp
2 = .63, but not at Fz, F(1,12) = 4.42, p = .057, ηp
2 = .27. 
 
ERP Latencies 
Figure 2 depicts the grand average ERP waveforms and topographic amplitude plots. 
N2 Latency. N2 latency increased from central to frontal electrode sites, F(2,24) = 13.56, p = 
.002, ε = .61, ηp
2 = .53, with the shortest latency at Cz, followed by FCz and then Fz (all t(12) > 3.1, 
p ≤ .002). No other main effects or interactions were significant (all F < 1.1, p > 0.3, ηp
2 < .08.) 
P3 Latency. P3 latency increased from frontal to parietal electrode sites, F(2,24) = 7.54, p = 
.006, ε = .82, ηp
2 = .39, with Fz shorter than Pz, t(12) = 3.63, p = .003. Fz was not shorter than Cz, 
although this comparison approached significance, t(12) = 2.37, p = .036. Cz and Pz did not differ, 
t(12) = 1.29, p = .222. There was a significant interaction between electrode site and belief, F(2, 24) 
= 4.32, p = .025, ε = .82, ηp
2 = .27. P3 latency for believable conclusions were shorter than 
unbelievable conclusions at Fz, t(12) = 3.12, p = .009, but there were no differences at Cz or Pz t(12) 
< 1.2, p > .25 (both comparisons). The interaction of belief and logic was non-significant, F(1,12) = 
2.41, p = .147, ηp
2 = .17. No other main effects or interactions were significant (all F < 0.5, p > 0.6, 
ηp
2 <.04.) 
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Supplementary Analyses 
A characteristic behavioral belief bias effect was found in which belief influenced reasoning 
resulting in different logical error rates across conditions. A consequence of this is that the number 
of trials in each condition varied because only logically correct trials were analyzed and this can bias 
ERPs. Our main findings were differences in amplitude across condition. We analyzed this using 
mean amplitude that is not biased by number of trials, unlike peak amplitude, and so the differences 
on this measure are unlikely to be the result of an artifact (Luck, 2005). Nonetheless, to test this 
possibility we replicated the analyses using a subgroup of eight participants who did not differ 
significantly in the number of trials per condition F(3,18) = 2.91, p = .059, ηp
2 = .29. The mean 
number of trials per condition was: believable valid, 35.25; unbelievable valid, 32.38; believable 
invalid, 30.38; unbelievable invalid, 35.75. 
The significant differences in N2 amplitude found in the main analysis were not replicated but 
similar trends were found that approached significance. The comparison of electrode sites was not 
significant, F(2,14) = 4.20, p = .069, ε = .60, ηp
2 = .38. The interaction of belief and logic fell short 
of significance, F(1,7) = 5.16, p = .057, ηp
2 = .42. The remaining comparisons were also not 
significant, F < 1.1, p > .5, ηp
2 < .13 (all comparisons). 
The most theoretically important differences in P3 amplitude found in the main analysis were 
replicated in the subgroup analysis. P3 amplitude increased from frontal to parietal electrode sites, 
F(2,14) = 8.58, p = .005, ε = .91, ηp
2 = .55. Pz amplitude was larger than Fz, t(7) = 3.61, p = .009, 
but the other comparisons were not significant (both t(7) < 2.3, p > 0.05). There was no main effect 
of logic, F(1,7) = .12, p = .738, ηp
2 = .02, or belief, F(1,7) = 2.41, p = .164, ηp
2 = .26. There was an 
interaction of logic and belief, F(1,7) = 7.63, p = .028, ηp
2 = .52. Mean P3 amplitude was greater for 
unbelievable valid than believable valid conclusions, t(7) = 2.92, p = .022, but for invalid conclusions 
there was no significant difference between believable invalid and unbelievable invalid conclusions, 
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t(7) = 1.71, p = .13, although the difference was in the same direction as in the main analysis. The 
remaining comparisons were not significant, F < 1.3, p > .3, ηp
2 ≤ .15. 
Our latency measure was peak latency which can be biased by differences in trial numbers. Unlike 
the main analysis, N2 latency did not differ across electrode site, F(2,14) = 4.08, p = .065, ηp
2 = .37, 
although the trend was in a similar direction. No other comparisons were significant, F < 2.4, p > .1, 
ηp
2 < .26 (all comparisons). There were no significant effects of P3 latency, F < 2.4, p > .1, ηp
2 ≤ .25 
(all comparisons). 
Overall, the supplementary analysis confirmed the main P3 amplitude findings – specifically the 
absence of a main effect of logic or belief but the presence of a crossover interaction of these two 
factors. P3 amplitude is larger in conflict than in no conflict problems. In combination, the main and 
supplementary analyses indicate that this is a reliable effect. N2 amplitude findings and N2 and P3 
latency findings were not supported and are less reliable. 
 
Discussion 
 
Dual process theories propose that both heuristic and analytic processes are used during reasoning. 
Serial models claim that heuristic processes precede analytic processes. Parallel models claim that 
they occur at the same time. The aim of this study was to compare these two models. A typical belief 
bias paradigm was used with the addition of ERP recordings to identify when different reasoning 
processes occur. The results support the predictions of parallel models. 
The behavioral findings were as expected. Participants were more likely to accept logical 
conclusions and more likely to accept believable conclusions. There was also an interaction between 
these two factors. Participants were less likely to accept unbelievable conclusions than believable 
conclusions when the problems were invalid than when the problems were valid. This is the 
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characteristic pattern of results in belief bias experiments (e.g., Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; 
Roberts & Sykes, 2003). 
 
P3 and N2 amplitudes were greater when logic and belief conflict 
The most reliable effect, present in both the main and supplementary analyses, was the effect of 
the interaction of logic and belief on P3 amplitude without a main effect of either factor. P3 was 
similar for conflict problems, i.e. believable invalid and unbelievable valid problems, and similar for 
no conflict problems, i.e. believable valid and unbelievable invalid problems, but greater in conflict 
problems than no conflict problems. The difference between conflict and no conflict problems 
requires an evaluation of both logic and belief. Hence problems were not evaluated initially on the 
basis of belief or logic alone as predicted by serial models, it is the combination of these factors 
occurring simultaneously that influences P3. The interaction of logic and belief supports parallel 
models. 
A similar interaction was found in N2 amplitude, but it was not in the expected direction. N2 was 
larger for no conflict problems than for conflict problems, whereas it had been predicted that N2 
would be larger for conflict problems as these require a conflicting response to be inhibited (e.g. De 
Neys et al., 2010). The time window for N2 was chosen based on peak latency of this component, 
but it does overlap with the P3 window. This novel task may not have adequately elicited N2, also 
reflected in the absence of N2 effects in the supplementary analysis, and a further study is required 
to isolate the N2 component and establish how it is affected by belief bias in reasoning. 
 
P3 and N2 latencies were not influenced by logic or belief 
There was no overall effect of belief or logic on P3 latency. P3 latency is associated with the time 
taken to evaluate a stimulus (Kutas et al., 1977; Magliero et al., 1984). This indicates that the time 
Running Head: HEURISTIC AND ANALYTIC PROCESSES IN REASONING 
16 
 
taken to evaluate the conclusion is the same for problems that differ either in belief or logic. This 
supports parallel models in which these processes occur at the same time. The exception to this 
finding is an interaction of belief with electrode site. P3 latency was shorter for believable than 
unbelievable conclusions at Fz. However, this result is not reliable. Peak latencies are sensitive to 
differences in trial number across the condition that can lead to artifactual results. There were 
unequal trial numbers in the main analysis and this findings was not replicated in the supplementary 
analyses on participants with similar trial numbers. Future studies should seek to replicate this 
finding with larger trial numbers. There were no differences between conditions in the latencies of 
N2. 
 
Theoretical implications for dual process theories 
The findings provide support for dual process theories of reasoning in general. Studies of dual 
process theory have been criticized for failing to rule out alternative single system explanations of 
the data. For example, Keren and Schul (2009) claim there has so far been no direct evidence that 
people hold two interpretations (i.e., belief and logic) concurrently. Our ERP findings do 
demonstrate that these influences occur simultaneously, obviating this criticism and supporting dual 
process accounts. 
The findings of this study are compatible with parallel models. One recent example is Handley et 
al’s parallel competitive account. This proposes that both belief and logic may be processed by either 
heuristic or analytic processes. These two processes operate simultaneously and each cues a 
response. In this task, we assume that the heuristic response is a belief-based evaluation and the 
logical response is an analytic evaluation. These processes operate in parallel to influence the 
evaluation of the conclusion. 
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Another parallel model is De Neys’s logical intuition model. This theory is unusual in that both 
the logical and belief-based processes are ‘intuitive’, that is they are automatic evaluations that do not 
require analytic thinking. The findings of this study are consistent with this theory, but their 
interpretation according to this theory is that both belief-based and logical processes are intuitive. 
The analytic process occurs later. Whilst this study suggests that logic and belief are evaluated in 
parallel, further work is required to distinguish between different parallel models such as those in 
which heuristic and analytic processes occur at the same time (e.g. Handley et al., 2012; Sloman, 
1996) and De Neys’s model in which non-analytic intuitions can be both logical and belief-based. 
The findings are not consistent with the main serial model, the default-interventionist account 
(Evans, 2006). This explanation of belief bias is that an initial default solution is provided using a 
heuristic process based on the believability of the conclusion but an analytic process may intervene 
and override this response. This model does not explain the influence of logic on conclusion 
evaluation that was found in P3 as it predicts that only belief influences conclusion evaluation at that 
stage. Some support was found for this model in the analysis of peak latencies which were shorter 
for believable than unbelievable conclusions at Fz but were not influenced by logic, indicating a 
faster evaluation of belief than logic. However this result was not replicated in the supplementary 
analysis and is not reliable. 
It is possible that the design of this study in which the premises were presented serially prior to 
the conclusion encouraged ‘forward’ premise-driven reasoning from the premises to the conclusion 
rather than ‘backwards’ conclusion-driven reasoning1 (Morley, Evans & Handley, 2004). As 
influential default-interventionist theories of belief bias such as selective processing (Evans, 2007; 
Stupple et al., 2011) suppose that reasoning begins with an evaluation of the conclusion this 
procedure may not be a good test of that theory. However, this study does not seek to compare 
                                                 
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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premise-driven or conclusion-driven accounts. Our aim is to test more generally the properties of 
parallel and serial models. Our findings show that at the time when the conclusion is presented there 
is both an influence of logic and of belief. Therefore we show at least one situation in which there is 
a parallel influence of belief and logic on conclusion evaluation. Future research would be required 
to further investigate the generality of this finding in premise-driven and conclusion-driven 
reasoning. 
Our explanation of the parallel effects of logic and belief is that as a person reads a problem they 
build a representation of it. The representation might be a mental model of a logical possibility, a 
believable possibility, or both. These representations create a semantic context that influences the 
response to later words. Words that do not fit the semantic context are unexpected and require a 
change to the representation that is updated in working memory, eliciting a larger P3 amplitude 
(Polich, 2007). This is the case in conflict problems because logical and belief-based interpretations 
are incompatible and the new word cannot be consistent with both of them. Words that do fit the 
representation do not require it to be changed and elicit a smaller P3. This is the case in no conflict 
problems because new words are compatible with both logic and belief-based interpretations. 
 
Conclusion 
This study found greater P3 amplitude when evaluating conflict problems compared to no 
conflict problems. The detection of a conflict between a belief-based response and a logical response 
is consistent with other research (e.g., De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010; De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008). This study differs in that it shows when the two 
processes occur: they occur relatively early and in parallel. This provides support for dual process 
theories of reasoning in which belief-based and logical evaluations occur in parallel but not theories 
in which belief-based heuristic evaluations precede logical analysis. 
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Table 1 
Examples of problems from each condition 
 
Believable Valid  
Premise 1 
Premise 2 
Premise 3 
Initial conclusion 
Final conclusion word 
giraffes are bigger than mice 
zoots are bigger than mice 
elephants are bigger than zoots 
elephants are bigger than 
mice 
Believable Invalid  
Premise 1 
Premise 2 
Premise 3 
Initial conclusion 
Final conclusion word 
elephants are bigger than bicycles 
zoots are bigger than bicycles 
mice are bigger than zoots 
elephants are bigger than 
mice 
Unbelievable Valid  
Premise 1 
Premise 2 
Premise 3 
Initial conclusion 
Final conclusion word 
giraffes are bigger than elephants 
zoots are bigger than elephants 
mice are bigger than zoots 
mice are bigger than 
elephants 
Unbelievable Invalid  
Premise 1 elephants are bigger than bicycles 
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Premise 2 
Premise 3 
Initial conclusion 
Final conclusion word 
zoots are bigger than bicycles 
mice are bigger than zoots 
mice are bigger than 
elephants 
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Table 2 
Mean Percentage of Conclusions Accepted as a Function of Logic and Belief (standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
 
 Believable Unbelievable 
Valid 82.53 (9.14) 72.60 (15.16) 
Invalid 43.59 (28.16) 19.23 (15.84) 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the experimental procedure 
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Figure 2. Stimulus locked ERP waveforms at Fz, FCz, Cz  and Pz as a function of logic and belief. 
Scalp topography for the 250-370 ms time window as a function of logic and belief (N2). Scalp 
topography for the 300-500ms time window as a function of logic and belief (P3). 
 
  
